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QUESTION PRESENTED 
 Whether Illinois may require personal 
assistants working under the auspices of the State’s 
Rehabilitation Program to pay their share of the 
representation costs incurred by a union selected on 
a majority basis by the personal assistants 
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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
Amici curiae are the law professors and scholars 
listed in Appendix A.  Amici teach, research, and 
write about labor relations and labor law, and have 
expertise in the issues before the Court in this case.  
The interests of Amici are to maintain the integrity 
of the law regarding the application of the First 
Amendment to the public sector workforce, and to 
aid the Court by contextualizing the important role 
of labor unions in the public sector. 
A list of signatories can be found in Appendix A.  
Institutional affiliations are provided for 
identification purposes only. 
  
                                                
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, 
and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended 
to fund the preparation of this brief.  No person other than the 
Amici Curiae or their counsel made a monetary contribution to 
the preparation or submission of this brief.  Letters evidencing 






SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Distinct from their roles as sovereigns, state, 
local, and federal governments act as managers of 
large public workforces that carry out vital public 
functions.  Governments have adopted a range of 
strategies for meeting the inevitable management 
challenges that arise, and this Court has “often 
recognized that government has significantly greater 
leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than it 
does when it brings its sovereign power to bear on 
citizens at large.” Engquist v. Or. Dep’t. of Agric., 553 
U.S. 591, 599 (2008).   
Like many other public sector employers, 
Illinois has reasonably decided to manage its 
workforce of public assistants in part by allowing 
workers to select, on a majority basis, a union as 
their collective bargaining representative.  The 
selected union is then required to fairly represent all 
members of the bargaining unit as their exclusive 
representative.  In turn, members pay a service fee 
that covers their share of costs that are germane to 
the union’s representation.  These interlocking 
features—selection of a bargaining representative by 
a majority, exclusive representation, the duty of fair 
representation, and the service fee—are important 
aspects of a time-tested model of public sector 
workforce management that has been repeatedly 
upheld by this Court.  Here, however, Petitioners 
challenge both exclusive representation and the 
service fee (also called an “agency fee” or “fair-share 





I. Unlike in the private sector, state 
employers choose for themselves whether to permit 
their employees to bargain collectively, and can also 
set—within established First Amendment limits—
countless other parameters, such as the subjects 
over which bargaining will occur and the 
permissibility of strikes.  In other words, each state 
may structure its labor law in the manner that it 
concludes best promotes sound workforce 
management.  While some states accordingly reject 
bargaining with their workforces altogether, others 
reasonably conclude—and indeed, research 
suggests—that collective bargaining can be an 
effective way to aggregate, clarify, and channel 
workers’ preferences, and that collective bargaining 
can promote the state’s own efficiency interests by 
promoting workforce engagement and longevity.   
States that permit collective bargaining 
almost universally adopt the exclusive 
representation model.  Under that model, once a 
union has been democratically selected by a 
bargaining unit, the state bargains with only that 
representative.  Further, that union represents all 
the workers within the unit, including those who do 
not join the union.  The alternative—in which a 
union represents only those workers within a 
bargaining unit who choose representation—would 
allow a potential multitude of unions to demand 
separate negotiations and separate contracts with an 
employer.  States that adopt collective bargaining 
almost always reject this system, which threatens to 
raise bargaining costs and increase intra-workforce 





Likewise, states may reasonably conclude 
that, within a system of exclusive representation, 
employees should be required to pay their share of 
the costs of representation.  In particular, states may 
reasonably conclude that allowing bargaining unit 
members to choose not to pay their share towards 
the costs of representation would lead to free riding 
that would undermine the benefits sought from the 
exclusive representation system.   
Illinois’s particular interests in allowing its 
Medicaid-funded personal assistants to select a 
union to represent them in bargaining with the state 
are evident.  A union can serve an important quasi-
human-resources role in aggregating and 
communicating information about this 
geographically dispersed workforce.  This 
information can aid the state in determining how 
best to attract and retain a qualified and 
professional workforce, potentially improving service 
delivery and decreasing program costs.    Further, 
unions can help improve workforce health and safety 
through cooperative partnerships with public 
managers, as in this case, where the union has 
negotiated training and equipment programs. 
II. Both exclusive representation and the 
required agency fee are consistent with the First 
Amendment.  This case is squarely controlled by 
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) 
and a line of related cases, which there is no reason 
to revisit.  However, even if Abood were 
distinguishable, well-established First Amendment 
principles demonstrate that Illinois was free to 





This conclusion does not turn on whether the public 
assistants are state “employees.”   
First, public administrators are free to consult 
selected stakeholders—including elected employee 
representatives—through non-public channels, and a 
state’s choice to consult some individuals or entities 
and not others does not even implicate the First 
Amendment rights of those who are excluded.  This 
larger principle squarely encompasses the exclusive 
representation system, in which a state determines 
that it will set workplace policy in consultation with 
a majority-supported union, and not other unions or 
individual employees.  The only exception to this 
principle—that states may not selectively exclude 
individuals from voicing their opinions in public 
fora—is not implicated by this case.   
Second, public administrators are free to 
compel payments to subsidize mandatory economic 
associations that serve legitimate non-speech 
purposes.  This Court has applied this principle not 
just in the agency fee context, but also in the 
contexts of bar dues and mandatory advertising 
programs.  Thus, for the agency fee to be 
constitutional, Illinois need only show that it serves 
a larger system of economic association with a 
legitimate economic purpose.  Collective bargaining 
through an exclusive representative for the purpose 
of promoting stable labor relations and the effective 
administration of the personal assistant program 
easily qualifies under this standard. 
Accordingly, Illinois is free to conclude that its 





professional workforce of public assistants is best 
served by permitting personal assistants to choose 
an exclusive bargaining representative, and to 
require represented personal assistants to pay an 
agency fee. 
ARGUMENT 
I.  The State Has A Well-Established Interest In 
Managing Its Workforce By Allowing 
Personal Assistants to Bargain Collectively 
A. The Court Allows States Significant 
Discretion In Managing Their 
Workforces 
Over 20 million people work for local, state, 
and federal government.  See Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Table A-8. Employed persons by class of 
worker and part-time status, 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t08.htm (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2013).  This multifaceted workforce 
keeps homes and families safe and healthy, educates 
children and adults, and provides the public 
infrastructure upon which we depend.  See Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 
U.S. 528, 575 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(describing “fire prevention, police protection, 
sanitation, and public health” as “activities that 
epitomize the concerns of local, democratic self-
government”).  Government employers and 
administrators must maintain stable and productive 
relationships with their workforces, especially when 
they have diverse and even conflicting needs.  States 





workforce management.  Here, Petitioners challenge 
Illinois’s decision to allow certain publicly funded 
home-care personal assistants to choose to bargain 
collectively through an exclusive representative over 
those working conditions that are set by the state.  
Infra Part I.C. 
Recognizing that states require flexibility to 
manage their workforces effectively, this Court has 
“often recognized that government has significantly 
greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees 
than it does when it brings its sovereign power to 
bear on citizens at large.” Engquist, 553 U.S. at 599; 
see also Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. 
2488, 2495 (2011) (“Government must have 
authority . . . to restrain employees who use petitions 
to frustrate progress towards the ends they have 
been hired to achieve.”); Waters v. Churchill, 511 
U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“the 
government as employer indeed has far broader 
powers than does the government as sovereign”); 
United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 
101 (1947) (“For regulation of employees it is not 
necessary that the act regulated be anything more 
than an act reasonably deemed by Congress to 
interfere with the efficiency of the public service.”).  
Accordingly, this Court has permitted public sector 
managers much of the same discretion enjoyed by 
the private sector.  See NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 
746, 759-60 (2011) (“Like any employer, the 
Government is entitled to have its projects staffed by 
reliable, law-abiding persons who will ‘efficiently and 
effectively’ discharge their duties.”) (citation 





(2006) (“[g]overnment employers, like private 
employers, need a significant degree of control over 
their employees’ words and actions”); Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (“[G]overnment 
offices could not function if every employment 
decision became a constitutional matter.”); United 
States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter 
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973) (holding Congress 
may bar public employees from engaging in certain 
political activity).   
Many public sector employers, like their 
private sector counterparts, 2  have adopted 
management policies and practices designed to 
promote worker voice—that is, to enhance employer-
employee cooperation and to productively channel 
and amplify workers’ participation within an 
organization.  Petitioners seek to eliminate one such 
policy that is available to public employers and 
administrators—namely, collective bargaining with 
an exclusive representative chosen by the workers 
themselves, and supported by a mandatory fair-
share fee.  See Pet. Brief at 18-24.  If successful, this 
dramatic change in state labor policy would both 
eliminate a time-tested model of workplace 
                                                
2 The alignment of employee and employer incentives through 
workplace participation has been a significant theme in 
popular and academic management theory.  See, e.g., Eileen 
Applebaum et al., Manufacturing Advantage: Why High-
Performance Work Systems Pay Off (2000); Joseph M. Juran, 
Quality by Design (1992); David I. Levine, Reinventing the 
Workplace: How Business and Employees Can Both Win (1995); 
Saul A. Rubenstein & Thomas A. Kochan: Learning from 






management and depart from fundamental legal 
principles. 
B. The State Has Well-Established Interests 
In A Collective Bargaining System That 
Includes Exclusive Representation And 
Agency Fee Contributions  
1. Collective Bargaining Is A 
Traditional System Of Personnel 
Management With Potential 
Benefits For Public Sector 
Employers 
Collective bargaining has been part of the 
public employment landscape for more than five 
decades.  Wisconsin Employment Relations Act, Wis. 
Stat. Ann. Ch. 509 (West 1959).  Since then, it has 
become a familiar process that most state 
governments and the federal government have 
adopted in some form.  Joseph Slater, The Rise & 
Fall of SB-5:  The Rejection of an Anti-Union Law in 
Historical & Political Context, 43 U. Tol. L. Rev. 473, 
477-79 (2012).   
There is tremendous variation in states’ 
approaches to collective bargaining, making the 
metaphor of states as laboratories particularly apt.  
Unlike in the private sector, where federal labor law 
uniformly regulates employers within many sectors 
of the economy, see 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (National 
Labor Relations Act); 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. 
(Railway Labor Act), states choose whether to 
bargain collectively with their employees.  Moreover, 





bargaining by public employees may then set 
additional parameters, including the subjects over 
which unions may bargain, the legality of employee 
strikes, and the availability of various dispute 
resolution mechanisms.  The extent of states’ 
discretion in this area is illustrated by the varied 
approaches that they have taken:  
[State public sector labor] laws both 
vary considerably and are more subject 
to political shifts at a local level. A 
minority of states does not permit any 
public employees to bargain, and 
another minority only permits a few 
types of public employees to bargain. . . 
. Also, where collective bargaining is 
authorized, the scope of bargaining is 
generally narrower—sometimes quite a 
bit narrower—than in the private 
sector. Further, the majority of states 
do not allow any public employees to 
strike.  
Joseph Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of 
Public-Sector Labor in the Past Thirty Years, 30 
Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 511, 512-13 (2013) 
(hereinafter Slater, Unsettled State).  Accordingly, 
states can structure their labor laws to amplify those 
aspects of collective bargaining that they view as 
most helpful, and correspondingly to downplay or 
eliminate other aspects (such as the strike) that they 
view as counterproductive.    
However, there are also First Amendment 





which protect individuals’ rights not to associate 
with a union.  States may not require their 
employees to become union members or pay the costs 
of union ideological or political endeavors; at most, 
they may require represented employees to pay for 
the costs associated with collective bargaining and 
other activities that are germane to the 
representation.  Chi. Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 
U.S. 292, 301-02 (1986).  Further, bargaining unit 
members are entitled to notice and other protections 
of these rights, id. at 308-09.  
There are good reasons that some states adopt 
a system of public sector bargaining.  One reason is 
to enhance employer-employee communication.  The 
benefits of providing workers with a collective voice 
are evident in the reasons that workers themselves 
give for wanting better communication with 
managers:  not just to improve the quality of their 
own lives, but also to make their employers more 
successful.  Richard B. Freeman and Joel Rogers, 
What Workers Want 4-5 (1999).  
Unions are a traditional avenue for 
amplifying, clarifying, and channeling worker voice, 
allowing management to better account for worker 
views and priorities.  This role in aggregating and 
funneling employees’ perspectives not only helps 
those employees to feel more useful and engaged, but 
it also has been linked to certain productivity gains, 
including lower turnover, search, and retraining 
costs.  See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt and Arthur R. 
Traynor, Regulating Unions and Collective 
Bargaining, in Labor and Employment Law and 





eds., 2009).  Empirical studies have found that 
where mature collective bargaining relationships 
develop, “unions can increase firm productivity in 
certain industries, particularly if management 
constructively embraces, rather than fights, union 
contributions.”  Id. at 109-10; see also Richard B. 
Freeman & James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 
19 (1985) (arguing that their empirical analysis 
showed that “unions are associated with greater 
efficiency in most settings”).  The potential benefits 
of this arrangement are obvious, in that it helps 
public employers to improve morale and satisfaction 
as efficiently as possible.  Samuel Estreicher, “Easy 
In, Easy Out”: A Future for U.S. Workplace 
Representation, 6 (Nov. 30, 2013 draft), at: 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/labor-law----
easy-in-easy-out----december-12-2013.pdf  
(“[c]ollective bargaining provides a means for 
workers to collectively express their preference for [a 
particular workplace policy] and for parties to 
determine whether the collective benefits outweigh 
the collective costs of its provision”).  Not only would 
it be logistically difficult for a public administrator to 
replicate the union’s function in this regard 
(particularly when the relevant workforce is 
dispersed), but a unilaterally determined outcome 
could lack legitimacy in the eyes of the workforce. 
 In sum, governments may reasonably decide 
to allow their workers to bargain collectively for a 
host of reasons, including their judgment that 
unions can streamline workforce management.  
Although Petitioners do not directly attack collective 





from structuring public sector bargaining to require 
or allow either exclusive representation or the 
agency shop.  The next two subsections explain why 
public employers often conclude that these features 
are crucial to an effective system of public-sector 
bargaining. 
2. Exclusive Representation Is A Fair 
And Efficient Structure For Public 
Sector Collective Bargaining 
The American system of collective bargaining 
is built upon the premise of exclusive representation 
as chosen by a majority of workers.  See Emporium 
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community 
Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975) (“Central to the 
policy of fostering collective bargaining, where the 
employees elect that course, is the principle of 
majority rule.”); Clyde W. Summers, Exclusive 
Representation: A Comparative Inquiry Into A 
“Unique” American Principle, 20 Comp. Lab. L. & 
Pol’y J. 47, 47 (1998) (“[t]he fundamental ordering 
principle which shapes American labor law and 
collective bargaining is the principle of exclusive 
representation”).  Petitioners challenge Illinois’s 
decision to implement the exclusive representation 
system for home health care personal assistants.  
Pet. Br. at 35.  They suggest that, to the extent 
Illinois wishes to allow personal assistants to choose 
union representation, that representation should 
take place on a members-only basis.  However, 
members-only representation presents significant 
complications, potentially undermining or 





that lead states to permit bargaining in the first 
place. 
In a “members-only” or “minority-union” 
regime, unions negotiate only on behalf of those who 
want representation.  Non-members are not bound to 
union representation; conversely, the union owes 
non-members no duty.  Cf. Steele v. Louisville & N.R. 
Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).  From an employer’s 
perspective, however, exclusive representation is a 
significantly more straightforward system.  There 
are only two tracks for each unit of employees: no 
representation or complete representation by one 
bargaining agent.  Either the state will determine 
working conditions unilaterally, or it will meet with 
a single union, which is in turn obligated to fairly 
represent all bargaining unit members during the 
negotiation.  The importance of this aspect of the 
exclusive representation system should not be 
understated; indeed, some states structure their 
public sector labor law with an eye towards 
minimizing the number of different contracts that 
must be negotiated and administered even among 
different bargaining units.  E.g., Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 41.80.020(3) (2013) (requiring public sector unions 
representing separate bargaining units to bargain in 
coalition over health care benefits, with the resulting 
agreement to be common to all CBAs). 
In contrast, members-only bargaining would 
allow a potential multitude of unions within a single 
bargaining unit to each demand a right to separately 
negotiate with the employer over employment terms 
and conditions for their own members, resulting in 





Such a system would multiply the employer’s 
negotiation costs and greatly complicate the 
ramifications of such bargaining.  It would tend to 
generate instability and discourage compromise, as 
each union could compete with others on a 
continuing basis to demonstrate its ability to gain 
“more” for its members (and attack any others for 
accepting “less”).  Multiple-union units also have a 
much greater potential for discord between unions, 
leading to a greater chance of strikes or other 
disruption.  See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 52 (1983) (observing 
that the “exclusion of the rival union may reasonably 
be considered a means of insuring labor-peace” by 
preventing the employer from “becoming a 
battlefield for inter-union squabbles”); Abood, 431 
U.S. at 224 (discussing the “confusion and conflict 
that could arise if rival . . . unions, holding quite 
different views as to [terms and conditions of 
employment], each sought to obtain the employer’s 
agreement”). Such workplace disruption poses 
special concerns for public employers and 
administrators: 
Disputes during labor negotiations are 
especially costly in the public sector. In 
the private sector, competitors can 
provide goods or services that are not 
supplied by the striking workers.  In the 
public sector, however, the government 
is often the sole supplier of a service.  In 
many cases this service is essential, and 






Janet Currie & Sheena McConnell, The Impact of 
Collective-Bargaining Legislation on Disputes in the 
U.S. Public Sector: No Legislation May Be the Worst 
Legislation, 37 J.L. & Econ. 519, 519 (1994).3    
Further, exclusive representation removes 
employees’ incentives to undercut or derogate their 
colleagues who are on the “outside,” as could occur in 
a system of members-only bargaining.  In a 
members-only system, union-represented employees 
could try to cut a sweeter deal for themselves at the 
expense of the nonmembers, or employers could 
reward nonmembers exorbitantly in order to 
dissuade union membership.  In either situation, 
however, the members-only system results in conflict 
and disequilibrium. 
States that have opted for a system of 
collective bargaining almost universally require 
exclusive representation of employee bargaining 
units.  Their interests in stable representation 
equilibria, ongoing constructive dialogue, and 
reduced probabilities for strikes and other conflict all 
justify this decision. 
                                                
3 States have responded to this concern in part by prohibiting 
public-sector strikes in many circumstances.  Slater, Unsettled 
State, 513 (noting that “the majority of states do not allow any 
public employees to strike”).  However, states may also 
reasonably conclude that exclusive bargaining is more likely to 
reduce the risk of damaging public-sector shutdowns.  Cf. 
Currie & McConnell, 520 (“Strike costs, as measured by the 
incidence and length of strikes, are greatest in the absence of 





3. The Fair Share Fee Is An Important 
Component Of An Effective System 
Of Exclusive Representation 
Petitioners contend that even if exclusive 
representation is constitutionally permissible, 
represented public sector workers should 
nonetheless be permitted to opt out of paying their 
share of the costs incurred by their elected 
representatives.  Pet. Brief at 34-36.  But just as 
exclusive representation supports employer interests 
including “labor peace,” Abood, 431 U.S. at 224, the 
agency shop is critical to solving the free-rider 
problem that could otherwise unravel or seriously 
weaken collective representation arrangements.   
Agency fee agreements require represented 
employees to pay their “fair share” of the costs of 
union representation.4  The reason for the agency 
shop is straightforward as a matter of economics.  
Under a system of exclusive representation, the 
elected union has a duty to represent all employees 
within the bargaining unit, and the benefits of 
collective bargaining flow to all as well.   Steele, 323 
U.S. at 202 (“It is a principle of general application 
that the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf 
of others involves the assumption toward them of a 
duty to exercise the power in their interest and 
behalf, and that such a grant of power will not be 
                                                
4 Petitioners make no allegation that their funds are going to 
anything other than the costs of negotiating and administering 
a collective bargaining agreement.  Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 
692, 696 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that Petitioners “do not allege 
that the actual fees collected are too high or that the fees are 





deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for 
whom it is exercised unless so expressed.”).  The 
economic consequences of eliminating the agency 
fee—the free rider problem—are easy to model.  See 
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public 
Goods and the Theory of Groups 88 (1971 ed.) (“A 
rational worker will not voluntarily contribute to a 
(large) union providing a collective benefit since he 
alone would not perceptibly strengthen the union, 
and since he would get the benefits of any union 
achievements whether or not he supported the 
union.”); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of 
Law 430 (8th ed., 2011) (“The representation 
election, the principle of exclusive representation, 
and the union shop together constitute an ingenious 
set of devices . . . for overcoming the free-rider 
problems that would otherwise plague the union  . . . 
.”).  The empirical evidence supports the model’s 
predictions.  See Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, New 
Governance, and the Ghent System, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 
319, 354 & n.187 (2012) (“[s]everal studies show that 
the level of free riding is higher in right-to-work 
states”) (citing studies). 
This court has previously acknowledged this 
economic reality.  See Abood, 431 U.S. at 221-22 (the 
“union-shop arrangement has been thought to 
distribute fairly the cost of these activities among 
those who benefit, and it counteracts the incentive 
that employees might otherwise have to become free-
riders”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and 
footnote omitted)).  Likewise, Justice Scalia 
explained in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 





Where the state imposes upon the 
union a duty to deliver services, it may 
permit the union to demand 
reimbursement for them; or, looked at 
from the other end, where the state 
creates in the nonmembers a legal 
entitlement from the union, it may 
compel them to pay the cost.  The 
“compelling state interest” that justifies 
this constitutional rule . . . is that in 
some respects they are free riders 
whom the law requires the union to 
carry—indeed, requires the union to go 
out of its way to benefit, even at the 
expense of its other interests.  
Id. at 556 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 Petitioners’ arguments against agency fees 
demonstrate the interconnectedness of such fees 
with the American system of collective bargaining 
and exclusive representation.  They argue that 
agency fees cannot be justified by the exclusive 
representation responsibility because unions choose 
such responsibility.  Pet. Brief at 35.  But this 
ignores that Illinois law requires unions to 
undertake this responsibility if they wish to 
represent any employees at all, infra Part I.C.  And 
as discussed earlier, states have good reason for 
mandating exclusive representation as part of their 
collective bargaining systems, supra Part I.B.2. 
Eliminating agency fees would disrupt the 





constructed by Illinois and other states to serve their 
employment needs.  Exclusive representation and 
the agency shop are closely linked, and a state that 
chooses the former has strong economic reasons to 
adopt the latter as well.  As a matter of policy, 
economics, and constitutional law, states should be 
free to provide for collective-bargaining relationships 
like the one at issue here. 
C. Illinois Has Reasonably Chosen 
Collective Bargaining By Personal 
Assistants As Its System Of Personnel 
Management for Its Home-Care Program 
Petitioners argue that, even if states generally 
have interests sufficient to support their systems of 
collective bargaining, Illinois has no such interest 
here.  Pet. Br. at 24-31, 39-46.  However, Illinois has 
perhaps a greater interest in establishing a system 
of collective representation in the home health care 
arena, given the challenges it faces in managing 
service provision in this context.  Whereas the 
previous two subsections have shown why states 
generally may choose to allow their workforces to 
bargain collectively, this subsection focuses on the 
role of collective bargaining in Illinois’s 
administration of the home-care personal assistant 
program. 
Like many other states, Illinois allows its 
workforce to select bargaining representatives.  See 
Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA), 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
315/1 et seq.  Under the PLRA, a union chosen on a 
majority basis by the members of a bargaining unit 





purposes of contract negotiations about employment 
terms, and must represent all bargaining unit 
members fairly.  5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 315/3(f), 315/9(a-
5), 315/6(d).  Further, Illinois law permits the state 
to agree to an agency shop.  5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
315/6(e). 
Illinois’s Medicaid-funded Home Services 
Program (Rehabilitation Program) provides care to 
disabled individuals in their homes.  See 20 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 2405/1 et seq.; 89 Ill. Admin. Code 
676.10 et seq.  The advantages of home care include 
lower costs for housing, greater comfort for 
customers, and easier access for family and loved 
ones.  See 89 Ill. Admin. Code 676.10(a).  However, 
managing the provision of care across thousands of 
homes requires innovative and flexible approaches in 
order to balance customers’ privacy and control with 
the interests of the state in ensuring proper care for 
its entire eligible population.  Illinois has chosen to 
permit its over 20,000 personal assistants who serve 
customers through this program to choose whether 
to bargain collectively.  5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 315/3(n)-
(o); Public Act 93-204 (Dist. Ct. Doc. 32-10).5  
 The State has a set of diverse interests in 
managing the long-term and ongoing relationships 
between itself, customers, and personal assistants.   
Further, it has reasonably concluded these interests 
are best served by offering the personal assistants 
an opportunity to bargain collectively.  Three of 
                                                
5  The Disabled Persons Rehabilitation Act was similarly 
amended.  20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 2405/3(f); Public Act 93-204 (Dist. 





these interests—managing employee productivity, 
protecting customer health and safety, and 
protecting personal assistants’ health and safety—
are discussed further below. 
1.  As the entity responsible for paying 
personal assistants to provide home care services 
within a state program, Illinois has an employer’s 
interest in managing workforce productivity to 
ensure services are readily available, effective, and 
efficient.  
A union’s role in aggregating employee voice, 
supra Part I.B.1, is especially important in the home 
care context.  Unions can collect information about 
the issues faced by geographically dispersed personal 
assistants, including employment problems they are 
encountering and suggestions they have for 
improvements, and communicate that information to 
the state in an organized fashion.  Essentially, the 
union can serve as a quasi-human-resources 
department for a set of workers whose dispersion 
would otherwise present a serious management 
challenge.  Further, qualitative studies of the health 
care industry have demonstrated that unions help 
build teams, foster the growth of human capital, and 
improve patient outcomes.  Thomas Kochan, Will the 
Supreme Court Support or Block Development of a 
Modern Collective Bargaining System for Homecare 










(“The Kaiser Permanente study . . . documents the 
significant investments in resources, time, and 
personnel required of unions to develop the capacity 
and mobilize and serve the workforce in partnership, 
team, and network building activities.”).   
2.  Moreover, the State has an interest in 
protecting customer health and safety by ensuring a 
stable and well-qualified workforce available to all 
qualified customers who could benefit from the 
program.  The State pursues this interest—balanced 
against its interest in ensuring that customers are 
empowered to decide among individual workers—in 
part through its hiring qualifications and review 
process for personal assistants.  89 Ill. Admin. Code 
686.10.  However, the interest is a continuing one 
that goes beyond any individual customer’s choice of 
a particular personal assistant.  In particular, the 
state has an interest in attracting qualified workers 
into the program and lowering the turnover rate 
among personal assistants, because longevity 
contributes to a competent and professional 
workforce.  This interest is particularly acute in the 
home health care field, which is plagued with high 
turnover based in part on low wages and worker 
dispersion and isolation.  See Kochan, Homecare, 2.  
Unions can serve the State’s interests in 
customer health and safety by helping to lower 
employee turnover, cut search and retraining costs, 
and boost productivity in the context of a cooperative 
partnership with an employer.  See supra Part I.B.1; 
see also Kochan, Homecare, 9 (recent research 
“demonstrates that productivity, quality, customer 





when union and management leaders work together 
and apply state-of-the-art concepts and tools to 
foster a cooperative, low conflict, high employee 
involvement, transformed workplace” (emphasis in 
original)).  Perhaps most obviously, union-negotiated 
benefits can reduce personal assistants’ incentives to 
leave the field.  For example, the current collective 
bargaining agreement in this case established 
significantly improved (yet still modest) wages, CBA, 
Art. VII, Sec. 1, a health benefits fund, Art. VII, Sec. 
2; a Personal Assistants Training Program 
administered jointly by the State and the union, Art 
IX, Sec. 1 & CBA at 18-22 (Side Letter); an 
orientation program, Article IX; a grievance 
procedure with binding arbitration for wage, hour, 
and other contractual disputes, Article XI; and a no-
strike clause that prohibits work stoppages, Art. XII, 
Sec. 5.6  These improvements stabilize the workforce 
and lead to better care for customers.   
3.  Further, the State has a particular interest 
in its own workforce’s health and safety.  While this 
is true of all public employees, entering another 
person’s home to provide personal, intimate care can 
entail unique safety concerns.  See Gurumurthy 
Ramachandran et al., Handling Worker and Third 
Party Exposures to Nanotherapeutics During Clinical 
Trials, 40 J.L. Med. & Ethics 856, 862 (2012) (“While 
the employer of the workers may be responsible for 
the health and safety of the workers, they may not 
                                                
6 The current CBA is available on the Illinois Department of 







have complete control over exposures in the home.”).  
Unions and employers have developed a variety of 
programs for protecting health and safety.  Some are 
as straightforward as encouraging employees to 
report health and safety problems so they can be 
addressed quickly (and creating a mechanism for 
them to do so), or calling for the provision of gloves 
to address an existing health and safety concern, 
CBA, Art. IX, Sec. 2.  Others are more complex, such 
as the creation of a joint committee to study health 
and safety issues, Art. IX, Sec. 1; or the provision of 
employee home health care training—something 
that is underprovided in the home health care field, 
and that may require creative approaches to 
effectuate.  See Ramachandran, 40 J.L. Med. & 
Ethics at 862. (“[t]he training of home care workers 
is variable and often inadequate.”). 
All but one of the Petitioners in this case 
provide home care as an assistant to a family 
member.  J.A. 17-18.  The State’s interest in the 
provision of care by these assistants is not 
diminished by Petitioners’ familial relations.  In fact, 
for many personal assistants who are related to their 
customers, their relative isolation and inexperience 
in this labor force make the union’s experience and 
the union-negotiated training opportunities even 
more important.  However, the state has an even 
greater interest in ensuring quality services for the 
many customers who cannot (or who prefer not to) 







II. Public Employers And Administrators May 
Agree To Exclusive Representation And The 
Agency Shop In Order To Effectively And 
Efficiently Deliver Home Health Care  
The previous section discussed why states like 
Illinois have reasonably decided to allow personal 
assistants the opportunity to elect a union to 
represent them in bargaining.  Permitting union 
representation—including exclusive representation 
and the agency shop—helps achieve government 
interests including stabilized labor relations and the 
development of a qualified, professional workforce.  
This section shows why this policy choice does not 
violate the First Amendment, and why exclusive 
representation and the agency shop are instead 
consistent with a long line of settled case law from a 
variety of contexts.  
As an initial matter, amici maintain that this 
case is squarely controlled by Abood v. Detroit Bd. of 
Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and that there is no reason 
to revisit Abood or any of the other cases upholding 
the constitutionality of the agency shop. 7  
                                                
7 Petitioners imply that Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 
209 (1977) is the only case that this Court would need to 
overturn should petitioners prevail in their position that public 
sector exclusive representation and the agency shop 
arrangements are unconstitutional.  Pet. Br. at 16-36.  As this 
Part demonstrates, that is incorrect; in fact, petitioners’ 
position is inconsistent with a series of cases concerning the 
constitutionality of cooperative economic programs involving 
compelled payments, such as bar associations and agricultural 
advertising schemes, infra Part II.B, as well as with First 





Nonetheless, this section shows that even if this 
Court were to conclude that Abood is not on all fours 
with the facts of this case, there is no First 
Amendment barrier to Illinois’s chosen collective 
bargaining system.   
This Court generally defers to government 
managerial decision-making, protecting 
government’s ability to act freely in its role as 
“manager of its ‘internal operation,’” as distinct from 
its role as sovereign.  Nelson, 131 S.Ct. at 757 
(quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961)); see also 
Engquist, 553 U.S. at 598.  Accordingly, this Court 
                                                                                                
including (though not limited to) cases arising in the public 
employment context, cited in this Part.   
Further, Petitioners mischaracterize Abood as an anomaly in 
which the Court imported the “labor peace” rationale from the 
Commerce Clause context, Pet. Br. at 19-21.  To the contrary, 
Abood rested on a series of previous First Amendment cases 
arising in the context of the Railway Labor Act, and it has been 
repeatedly reaffirmed in the public sector context.  E.g., 
Railway Employees Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956) 
(union shop agreement under Railway Labor Act did not violate 
First Amendment); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 
740, 746-48 & 768-69 (1961) (characterizing Hanson as First 
Amendment decision and construing Railway Labor Act to 
avoid constitutional problems); Hudson, 475 U.S. at 301; 
Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 555-56 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (construing the 
“constitutional rule suggested in Hanson and later confirmed in 
Abood” and describing “compelling state interest” that supports 
constitutionality of agency shop); Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207, 
213-14 (2009) (characterizing constitutionality of agency shop 
in public sector as “general First Amendment principle”).  
These cases would also be vulnerable in the event that this 





has often held that the First Amendment rights of 
individuals who perform work for the government 
can be overcome by government proprietors’ exercise 
of their managerial prerogatives to effectively and 
efficiently provide services.  E.g., Guarnieri, 131 
S.Ct. at 2494 (government’s “substantial interest in 
ensuring that all of its operations are efficient and 
effective” justify “[r]estraints” on workforce); 
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (“When a citizen enters 
government service, the citizen by necessity must 
accept certain limitations on his or her freedom”).  
Further, the government’s status a “proprietor” or 
“manager” of internal operations is not limited to 
situations in which it is also a common-law 
“employer.”  Nelson, 131 S.Ct. at 758-59 (rejecting 
argument that diminished First Amendment 
protections applicable to public employees did not 
apply to independent contractors); see also O’Hare 
Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 
721-22 (1996) (First Amendment protections do not 
turn on common-law distinction between contractor 
and public employee); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678-80 (1996) (same).  
Accordingly, these principles control even if this 
Court concludes that Illinois is not the technical 
employer of the personal assistants.   
For the reasons that follow, Illinois’s decision 
to permit personal assistants to choose an exclusive 







A. Exclusive Representation Is Consistent 
With The First Amendment Because 
Governments May Decide With Whom To 
Consult Before Setting Working 
Conditions 
Petitioners argue that Illinois’s adoption of 
the exclusive representation system violates the 
First Amendment because “homecare providers are 
not managed or supervised by the State.”  Pet. Br. at 
39.  Putting aside the factual accuracy of that 
statement,8 it is irrelevant to the First Amendment 
analysis.  Petitioners’ argument regarding exclusive 
representation assumes that governments may not 
consult some stakeholders through a non-public 
channel that is not available to all stakeholders.  But 
government entities are generally free to privately 
consult anyone, including a union designated by a 
majority of the workforce, in making its decisions; 
conversely, governments are generally free to ignore 
anyone, including individual workers.  The exception 
to this general principle—that government may not 
exclude individuals, including union-represented 
public employees, from being heard in public fora—is 
not applicable here.   
This Court’s decision in Minn. State Bd. for 
Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984) is 
largely dispositive of this issue.  Knight concerned 
the constitutionality of Minnesota’s exclusive 
                                                
8 As Respondents Quinn and SEIU HII describe, Illinois has 
considerable oversight over the personal assistants as their 






representation rule under which the state would 
either bargain or “meet and confer” over terms and 
conditions of employment only with elected exclusive 
representatives of professional employees.  Id. at 
274-75.  A group of community college faculty 
brought a First Amendment challenge, claiming, in 
this Court’s words, “an entitlement to a government 
audience for their views.”  Id. at 282.  Rejecting that 
claim, the Court reasoned that “Minnesota has 
simply restricted the class of persons to whom it will 
listen in its making of policy,” which it was free to do 
because “[t]he Constitution does not grant to 
members of the public generally a right to be heard 
by public bodies making decisions of policy.” Id. at 
282, 283.   
In other words, Petitioners’ First Amendment 
rights are not even implicated by Illinois’s decision 
to adopt the exclusive representation system for 
negotiations over certain employment terms, 
because states are generally free to set workplace 
policy in a non-public process in consultation with 
some constituent groups—here, an organization 
selected by the affected workforce itself—and not 
others.  Moreover, this principle does not depend on 
whether the state is acting as an employer.  Id. at 
286 (“[a]ppellees thus have no constitutional right as 
members of the public to a government audience for 
their policy views”) (emphasis added); see also Smith 
v. Ark. State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 465 
(1979) (“the First Amendment does not impose any 
affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to 
respond, or . . . to recognize the association and 





Conversely, Petitioners remain free to 
advance any position, including positions that are 
adverse to the state or the union, either individually 
or in concert, through any channels that are open to 
the public.  City of Madison v. Wis. Employment 
Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976) (union-
represented employees have First Amendment right 
to speak “[w]here the State has opened a forum for 
direct citizen involvement”); Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 521 
(employees are “free to petition their neighbors and 
government in opposition to the union which 
represents them”).  However, this principle bears no 
relevance to this case, because Petitioners do not 
allege that Illinois has opened the bargaining 
process to the public, yet excluded Petitioners.  Cf. 
City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 178-79 (“the First 
Amendment plays a crucially different role when . . . 
a government body has . . . determined to open its 
decisionmaking processes to public view and 
participation”) (Brennan, J., concurring).  Nor does 
bargaining with an exclusive representative itself 
create a public forum.  Perry Education Ass’n, 460 
U.S. at 48-49 (opening school mail system to union 
with exclusive representative status did not trigger 
obligation to allow rival union mail system access). 
Accordingly, this Court’s settled precedent is 
entirely consistent with Illinois’s decision to adopt 






B. The Agency Shop Is Constitutional 
Because It Is Germane To A Larger 
Program Of Economic Association With 
Legitimate Economic Ends 
Governments may compel payments to 
subsidize mandatory economic associations that in 
turn serve legitimate economic ends.  Glickman v. 
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469 
(1997) (mandatory payment permissible “as a part of 
a broader collective enterprise in which 
[participants’] freedom to act independently is 
already constrained by the regulatory scheme”); see 
also United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 413 
(2001) (compelled payments to private organization 
permissible as part of required economic cooperation 
where there is “some state imposed obligation which 
makes group membership less than voluntary”).  
This principle underlies not just Abood and other 
cases concerning the agency shop, supra n.6, but also 
cases concerning mandatory bar dues and generic 
agricultural advertising schemes.  These cases 
reveal that governments may solve collective 
economic problems through mandatory associations, 
including by requiring participants to make 
payments to support these associations. 9   Thus, 
Illinois need only show that it adopted the agency 
shop within its workforce of personal assistants as 
part of a larger regulatory system of economic 
cooperation with a predominantly non-speech-
                                                
9 This principle should apply a fortiori in the context of the 
public sector workforce, itself a form of economic association in 
which states’ heightened managerial interests can often 





related purpose.  Here, that system is collective 
bargaining through an exclusive representative, and 
its purpose is the promotion of stable labor relations 
in order to achieve the goals described in Part I.C.   
This Court has generally permitted 
governments to address collective economic problems 
by requiring a regulated community to associate.  
See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (describing “minimal constitutional 
protection of the freedom of commercial 
association”).  Further, members of the regulated 
community may be required to financially contribute 
to the association’s work that is germane to the 
legitimate economic purpose.  Accordingly, Abood 
began by identifying the larger collective enterprise 
of which the agency fee was a part:  allowing 
bargaining units of public sector workers to select an 
exclusive representative, to achieve labor peace.  431 
U.S. at 224.  The Court relied on Michigan’s 
judgment that the agency shop was an important 
component of effective union representation of public 
sector workers, for many of the reasons discussed in 
Part I.B, before ultimately holding that bargaining 
unit members could be required to fund only those 
expenses that are “germane to [a union’s] duties as 
collective-bargaining representative.”  Id. at 223, 
232, & 235.  This case falls squarely within that 
holding. 
The Court has applied this approach in other 
cases concerning compelled subsidization of 
mandatory associations.  For example, in Keller v. 





applied Abood in permitting mandatory bar dues to 
the extent they are germane to “the State’s interest 
in regulating the legal profession and improving the 
quality of legal services.”  Id. at 13.  Like in Abood, 
the Court did not apply strict scrutiny, which would 
have demanded that California show that there were 
no alternatives—either to its regulation of lawyers 
through a non-governmental bar association, or to 
the bar association’s decision to levy mandatory 
(rather than optional) dues—that did not require the 
mandatory payment.  Compare id. at 12 (concluding 
that it was “appropriate” to require attorneys to 
contribute to bar associations) with Minneapolis Star 
& Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575, 585 (1983) (strict scrutiny requires government 
to show interest of compelling importance that 
cannot be achieved through alternative method).10  
Further, this was so even though the Court 
acknowledged that at least some germane bar 
association activities were likely to be ideologically 
objectionable to some bar members.  Keller, 496 U.S. 
at 15-16 (bar association activities not germane if 
they both had “political or ideological coloration” and 
were “not reasonably related to the advancement” of 
regulation of the legal profession).   
                                                
10 For example, the Court did not require California to show 
that it could not have achieved the attorney regulation it 
desired by making the bar association an arm of public 
government, in which case the objectors would have had no 
tenable challenge to mandatory assessments.  See Johanns v. 
Livestock Marketing Ass’n., 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) (“Citizens 
may challenge compelled support of private speech, but have no 
First Amendment right not to fund government speech”); 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting First 





Finally, in Glickman, the Court upheld a 
requirement that fruit producers contribute to a 
generic advertising program as part of a larger 
agricultural marketing program intended to 
maintain steady food supplies and prices.  521 U.S. 
at 461-62.  Again, the Court emphasized that the 
government was free to achieve its goal through a 
comprehensive cooperative program of which 
compelled payments were one part, relying on both 
Keller and Abood.  Id. at 473; see also United Foods, 
533 U.S. at 412 (emphasizing that Glickman 
“proceeded upon the premise that the producers 
were bound together and required by the statute to 
market their products according to cooperative 
rules”).  As in those cases, the Court did not require 
the government to prove that the required 
association and payment was the least restrictive 
way to support agricultural prices.  Further, once the 
government identified the legitimate interest served 
by the system of economic cooperation, the Court 
upheld the compelled payment by determining that 
it was germane to that interest.11  Glickman, 521 
U.S. at 473.   
                                                
11 The Glickman dissenters argued that the majority applied 
Abood too broadly—arguing that the mandatory subsidization 
in Glickman was not justified by the underlying cooperative 
economic interest—but they did not question the continued 
validity of Abood itself.  Glickman, 521 U.S. at 485 (Souter, J., 
dissenting).  Rather, they characterized Abood as “a specific 
instance of the general principle that government retains its 
full power to regulate commercial transactions directly, despite 
elements of speech and association inherent in such 





These cases demonstrate this Court’s 
approach in cases like this one, in which economic 
regulatory policy involves both required economic 
association and mandatory payments to support the 
association.  Under this approach, Illinois need only 
identify the legitimate economic purpose of the 
required economic association of which the agency 
shop is a part, and then show that the agency fee 
covers costs that are germane to that purpose.  
Moreover, Keller and Glickman illustrate that this 
approach does not turn on employment status, as 
both involved regulation of non-employees.   
United Foods is fully consistent.  There, the 
Court rejected a generic advertising program that 
did not involve a cooperative economic program of 
which required payments to a private entity were 
only one component; instead, the “only program the 
Government contends the compelled contributions 
serve is the very advertising scheme in question.”  
533 U.S. at 415.  Here, however, the payments are 
integral to the mandatory economic association, 
which is in turn designed to achieve a legitimate 
economic goal:  a collective bargaining system based 
on exclusive representation, in service of labor 
stability and the generation of a more professional 
workforce of personal assistants.  This is none other 
than the “labor peace” rationale articulated in 
Abood.   
Put another way, the state’s chosen method of 
achieving labor peace is not limited to compelled 
payments that support speech.  The agency fee 
undergirds the exclusive representation system, 





Amendment rights.  Further, both the agency fee 
and the exclusive representation system are 
cornerstones of the comprehensive collective 
bargaining structure that Illinois has erected.  
Collective bargaining is itself a form of economic 
association, as this Court’s cases treating both 
collective bargaining and labor unions themselves as 
economic, rather than expressive, institutions, 
illustrate.  See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 638 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“a State may compel association for the 
commercial purposes of engaging in collective 
bargaining, administering labor contracts, and 
adjusting employment-related grievances, but it may 
not infringe on associational rights involving 
ideological or political associations”); FTC v. 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 
428 (1990) (strike by non-employee attorneys not 
protected by First Amendment because government 
has greater power to regulate “economic” than 
“political” activity); Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. 
Allied Intern., Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225-26 (1982) 
(describing “political objective” as  “far removed from 
what has traditionally been thought to be the realm 
of legitimate union activity”) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (“[t]he interests of the 
contestants in a labor dispute are primarily 
economic”).  Accordingly, the Abood-Keller-Glickman 






In addition to the foregoing, regulatory 
schemes governed by the Court’s economic 
association cases must “impose no restraint on” 
freedom of expression; must not “compel any person 
to engage in any actual or symbolic speech,” and 
must not compel covered individuals to “endorse or 
to finance any political or ideological views.”  
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 469-70.  Petitioners argue 
that collective bargaining in the public sector is often 
inherently political.  Pet. Br. at 41-42 & n.12.  
Putting aside Abood’s own resolution of this issue, 
this Court has rejected the argument that public 
sector working conditions are inherently matters of 
public concern.  Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. at 2497 (“The 
Petition Clause is not an instrument for public 
employees to circumvent these legislative 
enactments when pursuing claims based on ordinary 
workplace grievances.”); Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 
(public employee’s concerns about confidence and 
trust in supervisors, office morale, and felt need for a 
grievance committee not matters of public concern).  
But more significantly, even if these matters do in 
some sense involve “public concerns,” this Court’s 
decisions make clear that the First Amendment 
associational interests of individuals working in 
government service, even when relating to public 
concerns, must be balanced against governments’ 
legitimate managerial interests.  See, e.g., Nat’l 
Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564-65 
(upholding legislative ban on certain political 
activity by federal executive employees that serves 
government interests in efficient operations); 
Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 99 (“If . . . efficiency may be 





classified employees in politics as party officers or 
workers, we see no constitutional objection.”).  Here, 
Petitioners are free to express their views on any 
issues they like.  They only claim a right to prevent 
the state from structuring its internal personnel 
relations in the manner it has determined most 
efficiently serves its managerial interests. 
Accordingly, Illinois is free to conclude that its 
interests and those of its citizens—particularly the 
customers who are served by personal assistants—
are best served when working conditions are set 
during bargaining with an elected exclusive 
representative.  The state is further free to require 
that personal assistants make agency fee payments 
in support of that larger program of economic 
cooperation, adopted to ensure a stable and 
professional workforce of personal assistants. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
Seventh Circuit should be affirmed. 
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